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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Tenth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! We regret that this 
year it will be a “paper only” event. The double whammy of sequestration and a continuing 
resolution, with the attendant restrictions on travel and conferences, created too much 
uncertainty to properly stage the event. We will miss the dialogue with our acquisition 
colleagues and the opportunity for all our researchers to present their work. However, we 
intend to simulate the symposium as best we can, and these Proceedings present an 
opportunity for the papers to be published just as if they had been delivered. In any case, we 
will have a rich store of papers to draw from for next year’s event scheduled for May 14–15, 
2014! 
Despite these temporary setbacks, our Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) continues at a normal pace. Since the ARP’s 
founding in 2003, over 1,200 original research reports have been added to the acquisition 
body of knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 70 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and encourage your future participation. 
Unfortunately, what will be missing this year is the active participation and 
networking that has been the hallmark of previous symposia. By purposely limiting 
attendance to 350 people, we encourage just that. This forum remains unique in its effort to 
bring scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. It provides the opportunity to interact with many top DoD 
acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both in the formal 
panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, breaks, and the 
day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to establish new teaming 
arrangements for future research work. Despite the fact that we will not be gathered 
together to reap the above-listed benefits, the ARP will endeavor to stimulate this dialogue 
through various means throughout the year as we interact with our researchers and DoD 
officials.  
Affordability remains a major focus in the DoD acquisition world and will no doubt get 
even more attention as the sequestration outcomes unfold. It is a central tenet of the DoD’s 
Better Buying Power initiatives, which continue to evolve as the DoD finds which of them 
work and which do not. This suggests that research with a focus on affordability will be of 
great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to come. Whether you’re a practitioner or 
scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
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Identifying Governance Best Practices in Systems-of-
Systems Acquisition1  
David J. Berteau—Berteau is senior vice president and director of the CSIS International Security 
Program, covering national security strategy, policy, programs, and resources as well as defense 
management, contracting, and acquisition. His group also assesses national security economics and 
industry. Berteau is an adjunct professor at Georgetown University and at the Lyndon B. Johnson 
School of Public Affairs, a director of the Procurement Round Table, and a fellow of the National 
Academy of Public Administration and the Robert S. Strauss Center at the University of Texas. Prior 
to joining CSIS, he was director of national defense and homeland security for Clark & Weinstock, 
director of Syracuse University’s National Security Studies Program, and senior vice president at 
Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). He served at senior levels in the U.S. Defense 
Department under four defense secretaries, including four years as principal deputy assistant 
secretary of defense for production and logistics. Berteau graduated with a BA from Tulane University 
in 1971 and received his master’s degree in 1981 from the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the 
University of Texas. [dberteau@csis.org] 
Guy Ben-Ari—Ben-Ari served as a deputy director and senior fellow with the Defense-Industrial 
Initiatives Group at CSIS. His work focused on the links among innovation, industry, military 
capabilities, and defense policy. Prior to joining CSIS, he was a research associate at George 
Washington University’s Center for International Science and Technology Policy. From 2000 to 2002, 
he managed collaborative research and development programs for Gilat Satellite Networks Ltd., an 
Israeli high-technology SATCOM company. From 1995 to 2000, he was a technology analyst for the 
Israeli government. He also consulted for the European Commission and the World Bank on 
innovation policy and project evaluation.  
Joshua Archer—Archer is an intern with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at CSIS, where his 
research interests include defense industrial supply chain and international joint development 
programs, particularly between the U.S. and Japan. Before joining CSIS, Archer performed supply 
side research in the defense and aerospace industry as a strategy consultant between 2010 and 
2013. In 2009, Archer was a researcher with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 
where he contributed to the Taiwan military capabilities profile of the Nuclear Threat Initiative 
database. He holds an MA in international policy studies from the Monterey Institute of International 
Studies. 
Sneha Raghavan—Raghavan is a research assistant with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at 
CSIS. Her work covers Asian and European defense trends, as well as analysis of federal 
contracting. Prior to joining CSIS, she served as a senior research assistant with AidData, a 
development finance database at the College of William and Mary. She holds a BA with honors in 
international relations from the College of William and Mary, where she conducted her thesis on the 
effects of U.S. foreign aid in nuclear proliferation outcomes of recipient countries. 
Abstract 
Acquisition governance currently confronts two problems: the growing size and complexity of 
systems-of-systems capabilities and the limited effectiveness of existing governance models 
                                                
1 This report was prepared for submission to the Naval Postgraduate School on the occasion of its 
10th Annual Acquisition Research Symposium. All inquiries about this report should be directed to 
David Berteau 
Center for Strategic and International Studies 
1800 K Street NW 
Washington, DC 
T: (202) 775-3136 
E: DBerteau@csis.org 
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to ensure the on-cost and on-schedule delivery of those capabilities. The Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS) is engaging in research on systems-of-systems acquisition 
governance best practices that could help the defense acquisition community overcome 
some of these problems. This report provides an update on the progress of that effort. It 
reviews the evolution of acquisition governance models throughout the history of U.S. 
defense acquisition, characterizes the ways in which those models fall short of meeting the 
challenges of complex systems-of-systems acquisition, and offers preliminary observations 
on best practices to overcome those challenges based on the results of CSIS research to 
date. That research to date includes two new case studies. The research is continuing 
beyond this interim report. The final report will reflect additional work and incorporate more 
case studies. 
Introduction 
In this age of diverse and evolving security threats, the defense community is 
acquiring weapons, platforms, and systems with greater complexity. Here, the term 
complexity is used to describe systems-of-systems (SoS) involving multiple, interrelated 
elements that interact unpredictably. As defense products and capabilities become more 
complex, they are stressing the structure necessary for the acquisition of defense SoS. As a 
result, the acquisition community has encountered operational challenges in maintaining a 
sufficient engineering and acquisition workforce and process, as well as outcome challenges 
in acquiring capabilities on cost and on schedule. 
SoS acquisition poses considerable challenges that the current Department of 
Defense (DoD) acquisition governance structure was not necessarily designed to address. 
Increasingly, defense capabilities must support the needs of multiple users and must 
operate as horizontally integrated systems incorporating multiple individual platforms and 
programs. The high degree of interoperability and collaboration required for these SoS 
capabilities necessitates not only advanced systems engineering capabilities but also 
advanced governance. Because the technical capabilities needed to achieve national 
defense missions have grown beyond the existing models of governance used to acquire 
them, the DoD faces challenges in developing, procuring, and deploying next-generation 
weapons and platforms. Furthermore, cost growth in its portfolio of accounts demonstrates 
that the DoD is encountering challenges managing cost and schedule risks associated with 
advanced and integrated capabilities.  
The research of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on SoS 
acquisition governance best practices aims to help the defense acquisition community 
address some of the challenges of complexity and improve its governance processes for 
such acquisitions. The specific research covered in this interim report is supported by a 
grant from the Fleet Logistics Center of the Naval Supply Systems Command, under the 
auspices of the Acquisition Research Program of the Naval Postgraduate School. The 
research under this project will conclude with a final report to be submitted in September 
2013. 
This report focuses on the practical application of the CSIS eight-attribute 
governance framework in comparative governance model analysis. Specifically, it observes 
how the attribute profile of two case studies—Future Combat Systems (FCS) and Maritime 
Domain Awareness (MDA)—has influenced the processes and outcomes of those 
programs. It outlines the challenges of complexity in SoS acquisition and the historical 
origins of those challenges. It discusses the eight-attribute framework for the evaluation of 
individual acquisition programs and applies that framework to the first two example case 
studies. Finally, it discusses themes indicated by the case study comparison. In the end, this 
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analysis suggests that getting governance right is critical to addressing the barriers to 
effective SoS acquisition. 
Complexity and Acquisition Governance 
The growing complexity of defense systems is not a new challenge to the defense 
acquisition community. Technology developments in defense have often outpaced the 
evolution of federal and defense procurement processes, and policies for acquisition 
governance have had to keep pace. As Berteau, Ben-Ari, and Zlatnik (2009) noted in a 
report by CSIS, “Current approaches [to acquisition] were developed years ago in an 
environment where the government was technically astute and worked closely with one 
vertically integrated contractor per program” (p. 2). Today, acquisition programs regularly 
involve large networks of contractors that integrate increasingly complex technologies into 
SoS, but the government has not maintained the kind of strong technical workforce 
necessary for it to stay on top of these emerging technologies. This gap makes it more 
difficult for requirement setters to independently forecast development schedules and 
component compatibility.   
By examining the applications of weapon system acquisition models over time, this 
analysis provides a basis for the CSIS acquisition governance framework in this report and 
the application of that framework to the case studies presented as follows. The analysis 
outlines two areas of foundational knowledge. First, how have preferred models for 
acquisition governance evolved over time? Second, how does growing complexity challenge 
the contemporary models for acquisition governance?  
Evolution of Acquisition Governance Models—Historical Context 
The DoD has exercised different approaches to acquisition over time, favoring 
various divisions of responsibility between industry suppliers and government customers. 
Harvey Sapolsky (2009) outlined these models in a paper published by CSIS, titled Models 
for Governing Large Systems Projects. Sapolsky’s discussion suggests that the government 
has preferred to push more of the functional responsibilities of acquisition away from itself 
and toward industry contractors over time. This is in part a product of the flow of human 
capital toward the private sector and the erosion of the government’s internal engineering 
expertise relative to industry. While the elements of the Sapolsky (2009) model have 
different levels of analytic validation, the overall trends of skill and task migration from 
government to industry are well-documented and difficult to dispute. 
The original model for weapons acquisition dates back to the earliest days of the 
U.S. defense infrastructure. At that time, the U.S. Navy could specify the warship it needed 
along with the design, construction, and outfitting of the ship. The Navy managed and 
performed production operations and generated technical requirements at all levels of the 
acquisition chain. Sapolsky (2009) titled this acquisition approach the “Arsenal Model,” 
under which the government forms its own industrial base. It relies on scientists and 
engineers within the federal government’s defense workforce. It is still employed to an 
extent today through the DoD’s network of arsenals and maintenance depots around the 
country. 
An acquisition approach known as the “Contract Model” involves greater industry 
participation in technical execution than the Arsenal Model. This model became dominant 
with the beginning of the Cold War. Increasingly, the government relied on the expertise and 
responsiveness of contractors to meet its needs for larger and more technically demanding 
weapon systems. Over time, the government maintained a workforce in contracting and 
acquisition program governance but began to outsource more technical execution to 
industry. 
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As weapons became more complex and management of these systems needed 
improvement, the acquisition community developed a preference for greater industry 
involvement under the Weapon System Manager Model of acquisition. This model employs 
large contractors responsible for the administration and coordination of a network of 
contractors working on subtasks integral to the overall acquisition effort. Passing 
responsibility to the weapon system managers has the advantage of involving large and 
responsive contractors that assist the integration of more complex systems that originate 
from a larger network of stakeholders. 
As the DoD began to manage less of the implementation and program management 
capabilities, it also started to lose its ability to provide technical direction for its acquisition 
efforts. This was accelerated by the end of the Cold War, when technical direction almost 
exclusively became the purview of industry. At this time, DoD leadership preserved combat 
capabilities while seeking savings within the technical functions of the services. This fourth 
model, known as the Outsourcing Model, grew more prevalent due to greater preference for 
private-sector program implementation over government implementation.   
The flow of more tasks and responsibility toward industry contributed to the growth of 
what Sapolsky (2009) called the “Lead System Integrator (LSI) Model” more commonly used 
today. Because the LSI Model has been adopted to describe a specific type of contracting, 
this paper refers to Sapolsky’s LSI Model as the “System Integration (SI) Model.” In the SI 
Model, capabilities requirements are still controlled by military officers, but technical 
expertise is contracted to SIs to advance the capabilities of the planned weapon systems.  
As the adaptation of Sapolsky’s (2009) governance models in Table 1 indicates, the 
evolution of acquisition governance models over time—from preference toward the Arsenal 
Model in the earliest days of U.S. defense acquisition to greater use of the SI Model in large 
weapon systems acquisition today—is characterized by the gradual removal of responsibility 
from the government buyer. In theory, moving all of the functions formerly performed by the 
government to industry contractors lessens the personnel burden associated with the 
maintenance of a large in-house acquisition workforce. Furthermore, reliance upon industry 
to designate technologies that meet warfighter demands should allow government buyers to 
internalize Moore’s Law and procure and deploy advanced capabilities in a shorter amount 
of time. However, this evolution has fallen short of expectations in practice and may instead 
be contributing to cost and schedule overruns and compromising the government’s ability to 
manage large-scale acquisition efforts.    
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 Evolution of Acquisition Governance Models 
(Sapolsky, 2009) 
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Note. The table has been adapted by CSIS and also appears in G. Ben-Ari and P. Chao’s Organizing for 
a Complex World: Developing Tomorrow’s Defense and Net-Centric Systems (p. 26). 
The changing distribution of responsibilities between the industry supplier and the 
government customer, reflected in the Sapolsky (2009) model, serves to frame acquisition 
governance challenges in SoS acquisition. In addition, there are two distinct models for the 
direction of acquisition governance. In the traditional approach to acquisition governance, 
the capabilities comprising a SoS are governed downward from the program level. In an 
enterprise-wide governance approach, governance flows upward from the capabilities level. 
Because the “enterprise approach” is an emerging model that is currently evolving to meet 
the demands of SoS complexity, its application is not evident in early-stage acquisition 
governance models. Instead, traditional, top-down approaches to acquisition governance 
have been most prevalent throughout the evolution of governance models, from the Arsenal 
Model at the dawn of U.S. armed services to the SI Model today.  
Complexity—The Problem Defined 
The DoD’s preferences for acquisition governance models have changed over time, 
reflecting the flow of human capital, technical knowledge, and production assets away from 
the government. In the process, the growth in weapon system complexity has outgrown 
existing models. Warfighters are increasingly reliant on capabilities developed as part of a 
broader SoS capability. These complex SoS are noteworthy for their size, scope, and 
inherent complexity. In this context, complexity is used to mean that systems consist of 
multiple elements that are typically developed and managed by more than one organization. 
This management dispersion adds to the complexity of unpredictable interactions inherent in 
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complex SoS. Furthermore, these system elements are often part of more than one set of 
capabilities; that is, a given system may be part of several SoS. This poses significant 
management and governance challenges. However, the payoff of successful delivery is the 
ability to achieve capabilities far greater than those delivered through individual programs or 
systems.  
The divergence of current governance models from the service’s complex SoS 
capabilities requirements is apparent in the pervasive acquisition challenges that the DoD 
faces. As capabilities become more complex, they demand a DoD systems engineering 
workforce that may exceed what the government customer can offer. Additionally, the DoD 
faces operational requirements from the demand for systems operability in multiple roles, 
missions, and environments. These challenges can result in structural difficulties for SoS 
capabilities that may not exist in traditional acquisition approaches. For instance, knowledge 
sharing—a straightforward task in traditional acquisition—faces new challenges in complex 
SoS acquisition efforts. Knowledge ownership and incentives for sharing become less clear, 
adding to the host of governance process shortfalls. Compounding these challenges in 
technology, operational requirements, and structure, the DoD organizations needed to 
develop and deploy the SoS capabilities are bigger and more difficult to manage and 
maintain than traditional acquisition organizations, particularly under the SI Model.  
The growing divide between acquisition governance models and acquisition in 
practice is also clear in SoS acquisition outcomes. The government customers’ ability to 
deliver complex SoS capabilities on cost in particular is declining. According to the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO; 2013), more than 86 Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs (MDAPs) in fiscal year 2012 showed approximately $400 billion in aggregated 
cost overruns since their first full-year estimates, representing a 4% ($90 billion) growth in 
development costs and a 5% ($290 billion) growth in costs of procurement. As dramatic as 
this cost growth is, this latest annual report from the GAO is actually anomalous when 
compared against even greater cost growth in the 2012 GAO report. In that iteration, 96 
MDAPs existing in that year had grown an aggregated $447 billion in excess of their original 
estimated costs (GAO, 2012). Given the expected impact of sequestration, the 2012 GAO 
report is likely to more accurately represent the trend in cost growth. That trend is 
particularly evident when compared with the 2007 GAO report, which cited 64 MDAPs in the 
DoD’s accounts that had grown at an average annual rate of 4.9%. This produced a total 
annual cost growth of $165 billion by those programs in that year (GAO, 2007, p. 8). This 
indicates that cost overruns grew 170.9% in the years between 2006 and 2011.  
The government is also encountering challenges in keeping its major weapons 
programs on schedule. In its latest report, the GAO (2013) found that MDAPs experienced 
an average delay of 27 months in reaching initial operational capability. This figure exceeds 
the 2012 estimate of 23 months in average delay (GAO, 2012, pp. 6–7). Combined with the 
upward trend in cost growth over time, this track record indicates that existing governance 
and management tools no longer suffice for today’s complex weapon systems.     
As cost and schedule overrun trends illustrate, delivering SoS depends on getting 
governance right. However, the traditional service-centric approach to acquisition 
governance is not sufficiently flexible to meet the needs of SoS. Specifically, flexibility is 
limited in two ways. 
First, the current process of generating requirements does not allow for the 
integration of changes in user needs. Because complex SoSs are inherently dynamic, non-
linear, and risk-intensive, acquisition leadership’s ability to react to changes in user needs is 
critical to the successful delivery of SoS capabilities. Structured but flexible oversight 
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procedures improve alignment between DoD requirements and fielded systems by 
establishing clear systems-level metrics and measuring progress toward declared goals. 
Systems must also be able to respond to changes in external factors in order to ensure that 
the SoS capability is as relevant when it reaches the production and deployment phase as it 
was in pre-acquisition phases. These factors could include macro-level changes in the 
security environment and technological advances as well as micro-level changes in 
organizational politics and acquisition effort leadership.  
Second, successful acquisition delivery requires the “power of the purse” to direct 
solutions and approaches. In order to direct efforts toward certain capabilities, program 
leadership must be able to dedicate resources such as real contracting dollars, as well as 
human capital and allocations for other overhead costs, to certain system efforts. However, 
budgetary power is limited when individual services and defense agencies are the highest 
level of governance, due to the relatively more limited ability of those stakeholders to 
guarantee funds for the system or to be able to shift and reapportion them at the system 
level. The process by which funds are secured also limits flexibility; the DoD’s 20-month-plus 
budget cycle that precedes actual appropriation may lead the DoD to acquire technologies 
that are bleeding-edge when a budget is begun but that may become outdated by the time 
the budget is enacted.  
Given the limited effectiveness of traditional service-centric governance approaches, 
it is useful to look at new, enterprise-wide governance models for the acquisition and 
delivery of complex SoS capabilities. Numerous platforms and systems comprise SoS, and 
the interactions of these components are highly unpredictable. Coordination of these internal 
constituent systems is necessary to achieve the desired SoS capability, which otherwise 
would be out of reach for any single component alone. An enterprise-wide approach to 
governance would facilitate oversight and accountability of the systems’ individual 
components to achieve that coordination. The following case study was selected to reflect 
both the traditional and enterprise approaches. 
Acquisition Governance Case Studies 
CSIS is analyzing selected SoS case studies in order to understand the merits and 
demerits of existing governance models for SoS acquisition. Once complete, and adding to 
the following two case studies, the case studies will contribute to a theoretical framework for 
the development of a new acquisition governance model.  
To date, the CSIS project team has conducted preliminary analysis of seven SoS 
case studies. Two relevant case studies are included in this interim report. The remaining 
case studies will be added to the final report. The FCS program case presents an example 
of a so-called traditional governance approach, in which governance of all systems is 
centralized at the program level and a program of record is established by the customer to 
procure the end-user capability. The MDA effort provides an example of an enterprise-wide 
approach to governance, in which families of capabilities are procured under the umbrella of 
larger programs with the MDA end-user capability in mind. Together, the two cases permit 
the introduction of a CSIS framework for the identification and application of acquisition 
governance attributes. Next, this interim report discusses the FCS and MDA case studies to 
offer a high-level picture of program performance. Finally, the framework is used to compare 
the FCS and MDA governance attributes and observe their relationship to program 
performance. 
Applying the CSIS Acquisition Governance Framework in Case Study Analysis 
Through previous work on acquisition models for the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD), CSIS has developed a framework for analyzing acquisition program 
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governance. The framework of eight attributes is presented for public release for the first 
time in Figure 1. 
This framework is based on the CSIS process of research on SoS governance 
models, interviews with programmatic stakeholders and industry leaders, and findings 
revision through input from SoS experts.  The framework attributes represent concerns, 
questions, and issues that must be addressed for an organization to be able to deliver SoS 
capabilities effectively. The significance of these attributes varies depending on the SoS 
being analyzed, but all eight attributes add important value to the final analysis. 
 
 Eight Attributes of Acquisition Governance 
This framework enables side-by-side comparison of programs like FCS and MDA. As 
demonstrated in the following case study comparison, the comprehensive acquisition 
governance framework allows dissection of an acquisition effort in order to examine the 
eight governance attributes independent of one another and to determine how the attributes 
correlate with quantitative performance metrics (e.g., gaps between test results and planned 
goals, schedule delays in months, cost overruns in billions of dollars, etc.). As part of this 
analysis, CSIS will be able to identify which attributes correspond more closely with poor 
acquisition governance. The analysis will also clarify and improve the eight-attribute 
framework outlining best practices in SoS acquisition governance. 
Figure 2 compares the FCS and MDA cases to illustrate how this methodology can 
be applied in practice. The comparison offers a notional qualitative analysis of program 
characteristics for each of the eight attributes. Program characteristics are presented without 
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direct comparison to one another and independent of the outcomes and performance of the 
programs themselves. Instead, this first-level comparison serves to compose an initial profile 
of the programs for further analysis of best practices. 
Future Combat Systems Case Study 
The FCS program is one example of how traditional acquisition governance has 
fallen short of meeting the challenges of complexity. This program, officially initiated with a 
four-team competition in February 2000 and terminated nine years later in 2009, was to be 
the Army’s major research, development, and acquisition program. It initially consisted of 18 
manned and unmanned systems linked together via a network. As the largest acquisition 
program ever attempted by the Army, FCS was envisioned to transform the service by 
replacing current systems such as the M-1 Abrams tank and the M-2 Bradley infantry 
fighting vehicle as well as by adding new capabilities. The advanced technologies 
associated with the FCS program, in addition to the challenge of integrating subsystems, 
posed large problems for successful development and contributed to the program’s high 
level of risk. The total cost for FCS ballooned to an estimated $200 billion at the time of its 
cancellation (Corrin, 2012). 
In May 2000, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) awarded 
four contracts to four industry teams to develop FCS designs. The Army awarded the LSI 
contract to a team led by Boeing and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) 
in March 2002 after nearly two years of design evaluation. The Boeing and SAIC team 
worked with more than 550 contractors and subcontractors in 41 states.   
The termination of FCS can be attributed to any of a number of problems. Three 
related to program flexibility are worth discussing here. First, the capabilities being 
developed under the program had fallen out of alignment with warfighter needs. The Army 
began developing the FCS concept in the 1990s, and the service had designed the system 
to meet requirements for rapid deployability, in-theater tactical maneuverability, and 
survivability. These requirements were not suited to the close-combat and urban terrain 
operations in which the Army was engaged post-9/11 (Pernin et al., 2012, pp. 54–57). 
Second, several evolutionary capabilities essential to program success were not developed 
at the projected pace. In its attempt to avoid capabilities obsolescence, the Army chose 
evolutionary capabilities to meet the core survivability requirements of the manned ground 
vehicle (MGV). The situational awareness and understanding (SA/SU) network, for example, 
was consistently behind its projected development schedule (Pernin et al., 2012, pp. 109–
110, 264). Third, in part due to the slow pace of capabilities development and the high rate 
of expenditure, remaining resources were low compared with the level of progress achieved. 
Sources projected in 2009 that 60% of the project’s funding would be exhausted by the 
Preliminary Design Review, leaving the remainder to cover the entire system development 
phase (GAO, 2012). In the end, FCS was terminated, and the Army continued the 
development of some select families of capabilities as individual systems (Malenic, 2009, 
2010). 
Maritime Domain Awareness Case Study  
MDA provides a useful contrast with traditional acquisition governance. MDA is not a 
formal program like FCS and other traditional acquisition efforts. Instead, this enterprise 
approach to capabilities acquisition is an interagency, international strategy to deal with 
threats and challenges in maritime theaters. The MDA system aims to support and integrate 
government-wide efforts to collect, fuse, analyze, and disseminate data among defense, law 
enforcement, and border protection officials from the U.S. and allied countries, creating a 
cross-domain common operating view.   
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The MDA concept originated from a 1998 presidential initiative and was developed 
further in two presidential directives (NSPD-41 and HSPD-13) released on December 21, 
2004. Since then, the established technology investment strategy and its supporting offices 
and business systems have undergone numerous changes. Currently, the National Maritime 
Intelligence-Integration Office (NMIO), under the direction of appointees from the Navy and 
Coast Guard, is the nominal lead for MDA’s information exchange portal, the open 
architecture tool at the heart of the MDA mission. 
Two stages or “spirals” of technology acquisition were planned to develop and 
integrate the infrastructure that MDA would need to achieve its mission objectives. While a 
number of policy directives have offered strategic direction, the participating agencies—
primarily the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy, with some additional contributions from Customs 
and Border Protection—have mostly led their own initiatives. Each entity is free to develop 
its own definition of maritime domain awareness. These definitions may not fit together 
across the enterprise, even though they are generated from the bottom up. As one former 
MDA executive expressed in a conversation with CSIS, “To some, binoculars are a maritime 
domain awareness technology.” 
Analysis of budget requests from 2009 to the present day shows that to date, 
services have procured MDA assets mostly under the umbrella of larger program elements. 
Furthermore, with the exception of some research and development programs led by the 
Office of Naval Research (ONR), the services have procured primarily non-development 
items (NDI) and commercial off-the shelf (COTS) products. As a result of this approach to 
acquisition, investments in MDA are difficult to quantify, progress is difficult to monitor, and 
oversight is difficult to ensure.  
Individually, the attributes described in Figure 2 underscore some merits and 
demerits of both traditional and enterprise-wide approaches to acquisition governance. The 
attributes also offer additional insight into acquisition governance best practices when 
viewed in comparison across the two case study programs. Thus, there are key attribute-
specific takeaways offered by the case studies, both in isolation and compared to one 
another. These takeaways are discussed in Figure 2. 
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 Comparison of FCS and MDA Acquisition Governance Attributes 
The cases illustrate that the impact of the level of organizational focus in acquisition 
governance is dependent on how much oversight is in place. In FCS, the concentration of 
organizational focus at the program level resulted in slow responsiveness to changing 
warfighter needs and factional protection of capabilities families, such as manned ground 
vehicles. Rigid oversight from the top constrained the program’s progress.  
In contrast with this organizational rigidity, the MDA case demonstrates that a more 
liberal organizational focus in an enterprise-wide governance approach also presents 
challenges. MDA capabilities acquisition efforts are divided among numerous programs, and 
the responsibilities for acquisition governance decisions are siloed within separate and 
occasionally unrelated programs. Progress on the MDA mission has been slow in part 
because of this dynamic. With greater oversight on the direction of capabilities development, 
it is possible that MDA assets could reach the theater more quickly and interact more easily. 
Additionally, the case comparison suggests that setting requirements and adjusting 
them to the changing demands of the end user is difficult under top-down governance, 
whether the responsibility of governance falls to the government or industry. As discussed 
previously, industry began taking the requirements generation role from the government 
during the evolution of acquisition governance from the Weapon System Manager Model to 
the Arsenal Model. The reason for this natural progression was that the government no 
longer had the technical astuteness to manage more advanced technical requirements. 
However, the FCS industry LSI also failed to adjust requirements properly and was similarly 
hamstrung in its efforts to manage subsystem capabilities. Indeed, the size of the 
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subcontractor network and the diversity of the systems and capabilities being acquired 
exposed the insufficiencies of a traditional approach to governance. 
The MDA effort, by comparison, has demonstrated more agility in its ability to adjust 
requirements to the end-user community’s changing demands. By distributing 
responsibilities for generating requirements across a network of programs and subprograms, 
the MDA effort has enabled those closest to the end user to determine capabilities 
requirements. While guidance from the DoD Executive Agent for Maritime Awareness has 
provided a framework for the capabilities required in its spirals of technology, the 
participating offices are free to determine what specific systems fit into that framework. The 
flaw in this approach is that the definition of maritime domain awareness per se can differ 
among the offices. Furthermore, there are no mechanisms to ensure that tasks are 
delegated between government and industry stakeholders in a way that enables timely and 
cost-efficient delivery of systems and subsystems. A critical system could be delayed due to 
a unit-level acquisition effort being governed under the LSI Model, for example, with 
potentially damaging consequences for the broader SoS. 
Thus, these differences in the two attributes for Level of Organizational Focus and 
Integration of Functional End-User Needs help to identify challenges in both the traditional 
and enterprise-wide approaches to acquisition governance. In contrast, similarities between 
FCS and MDA illustrate that some governance attributes transcend the dimension of task 
delegation between the government and industry stakeholder communities. Specifically, a 
comparison of the attributes for Enforcement, Incentive Structure, and Knowledge 
Ownership shows that there are critical oversight functions that both industry and 
government need to get right in order to facilitate complex SoS acquisition. 
The FCS and MDA cases both illustrate that system delivery suffers when proper 
oversight enforcement mechanisms are not in place. Use of an Other Transaction Authority 
(OTA) contract in FCS created oversight challenges at the systems level, resulting in limited 
enforcement of cost and technical readiness standards. It is also reported that the LSI 
issued contracts with standards below those in its contract with the Army. The Army 
addressed these issues when it revised the contract to a Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) contract and established processes for greater Army involvement in capabilities 
selection and requirements.  
Enforcement has been lacking at both the systems and SoS level within MDA. 
Because the MDA effort is a loose network of individual program offices guided by 
overarching objectives without prescriptive benchmarks, the DoD has encountered a good 
deal of difficulty in moving it forward and gauging its progress. 
Effective incentives for capability delivery on schedule and on cost were also 
noticeably absent in both programs. In the case of FCS, performance incentives were based 
on the completion of program events such as design reviews, rather than on a meaningful 
metrics-based assessment of technical performance. The misalignment of technical 
requirements between the LSI team and the government compounded this problem, 
detracting from the effectiveness of incentives in encouraging on-schedule capability 
delivery. Cost incentives also were based on artificial benchmarks, assessing contractor 
cost-performance based on the projected life cycle cost of capabilities rather than on their 
actual cost track record.  
The patchwork of incentives in MDA also appears to be ineffective. In contrast with 
the artificial incentives in FCS, MDA has few incentives at all on the SoS level. On the 
systems level, individual programs are responsible for the establishment of incentives for the 
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delivery of individual capabilities. A more explicit incentives infrastructure may be necessary 
to encourage greater commitment to the MDA objectives. 
Finally, the FCS and MDA cases underscore the importance of knowledge ownership 
in delivering SoS capabilities. Significant stovepiping was apparent in the FCS case, where 
the use of an industry-led acquisition workforce raised concerns among subcontractors 
about the fairness of competition and the use of proprietary information. These concerns 
created barriers to transparent information sharing across and within programs. While 
stovepiping has not been prevalent in MDA, unstructured information-sharing processes, 
combined with a lack of uniform maritime domain awareness definitions, have hampered 
knowledge sharing among the MDA stakeholders. 
Toward a New Acquisition Governance Model 
The case study analysis presented previously offers several preliminary key findings 
for the CSIS effort to identify governance best practices in SoS acquisition. The cases begin 
to support three themes in the creation of a new governance model. 
First, SoS acquisition governance benefits from having strong and structured 
management oversight procedures tied to documented results. Shared FCS and MDA 
shortcomings in Enforcement and Incentive Structure originated in insufficient or otherwise 
flawed oversight. The reported inadequacies of government oversight over the LSI 
exacerbated technical and programmatic flaws in FCS. In MDA, minimal oversight over a 
broad network of government customers has caused problems with both the establishment 
of requirements and the measurement of progress.  
Second, existing approaches to acquisition are challenged by high barriers to 
knowledge sharing and a lack of clarity regarding the ownership of this knowledge. The use 
of an LSI contractor in FCS created disincentives to information sharing, both within the 
program and with the customer. Industry stakeholders perceived that information sharing 
between and among their peers would damage their competitiveness and compromise their 
proprietary information. While these structural impediments to knowledge sharing are not 
apparent in MDA, that program instead has minimal incentives to promote knowledge 
sharing. In other words, explicit barriers do not exist between and among MDA 
stakeholders, but there is insufficient payoff for knowledge sharing outside of lower level 
systems. 
Third, a new model of acquisition governance may require more task sharing 
between government and industry than has been seen in prior models. Some problems with 
FCS are attributable to that program’s use of an SI Model of acquisition governance. 
However, similar problems apparent in the MDA program show that designating other tasks 
to government—in the case of that program, the task of Program Management—is not 
sufficient to fix problems of management oversight. In fact, a comparison of MDA and FCS 
shows that replacing industry with government in non-Program Requirements tasks of the SI 
Model to create a new model seems to have created additional problems with the lead 
agency’s ability to coordinate and enforce progress among other participating agencies.  
Conclusion 
As government demands to defeat threats to global security cause systems of 
capabilities to grow in size and complexity, the limited effectiveness of existing models of 
acquisition governance is becoming more apparent. The initial analysis reflected in this 
interim report underscores the importance of further research on best practices in acquisition 
governance with a view toward the creation of a new model. The example case studies 
presented here are a first step in an effort by CSIS to identify those best practices. 
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The case studies illustrate that getting governance right would involve a thorough 
analysis of how program outcomes are affected by a comprehensive set of governance 
attributes. Each of the eight attributes used here represents a different but vital element of 
any acquisition effort. Moving forward, the CSIS Complexity project team will perform an 
analysis similar to the one discussed previously across a total of seven SoS acquisition case 
studies to identify what practices in acquisition governance contribute to program success 
and what practices make successful capabilities development and acquisition more difficult 
to achieve. The preliminary cases presented here will also be refined based on the results of 
an ongoing primary research effort. 
This interim report serves as a progress report on efforts by CSIS to identify best 
practices in SoS acquisition governance. This effort will incorporate additional case studies 
in the coming months and will conclude in September 2013 with a full report on best 
practices and a framework for new governance models. The report will be presented at the 
May 2014 Naval Postgraduate School Acquisition Research Symposium. 
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